A-Void-Able Consequences: Void Sales & Subsequent Purchasers Under Arkansas’s Statutory Foreclosure Act by Hungate, Hannah
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
ScholarWorks@UARK 
Arkansas Law Notes School of Law 
6-2-2021 
A-Void-Able Consequences: Void Sales & Subsequent Purchasers 
Under Arkansas’s Statutory Foreclosure Act 
Hannah Hungate 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/arlnlaw 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Housing Law Commons, Legal History Commons, 
Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Citation 
Hungate, H. (2021). A-Void-Able Consequences: Void Sales & Subsequent Purchasers Under Arkansas’s 
Statutory Foreclosure Act. Arkansas Law Notes. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/arlnlaw/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Arkansas Law Notes by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more 
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu. 
 
A-Void-Able Consequences:  Void Sales & 
Subsequent Purchasers Under Arkansas’s 
Statutory Foreclosure Act 
Imagine the following:  you have lived in your home for 
years.  A bank holds your mortgage, and you pay promptly every 
month.  One day, out of the blue, you get a notice from the bank 
claiming that your home has been foreclosed upon and sold to a 
third party.  The notice indicates that the bank determined you to 
be in default, sold your home without notifying you, and now 
your home is no longer yours.  You rush to court to try to get your 
home back.  The court looks at the Arkansas statute and faces a 
dilemma.  Two results are possible from its language.  One 
assumes that the sale was not valid because it was done in 
violation of the law, and you can retrieve the deed of your home 
from the third-party purchaser.  However, under the other 
interpretation, the third party gets your home free and clear.  You 
can perhaps sue the bank, but your home is no longer yours.   
This conundrum is exactly the problem posed by Arkansas’s 
Statutory Foreclosure Act.  The Statutory Foreclosure Act 
articulates detailed requirements which must be satisfied before a 
foreclosure is valid.1  If a lender forecloses upon a home in 
violation of these requirements, the borrower has a legal claim 
against the lender.2  However, the process becomes more complex 
if the home is sold before the borrower can assert the claim.  Even 
after the property is sold, the Statutory Foreclosure Act still 
permits a borrower to sue a lender if the sale was fraudulent or 
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beyond. 
1. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-50-101 to -117 (2019). 
2. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2). 
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violated the statutory requirements,3 but it also states that such 
claim “may not be asserted against a subsequent purchaser for 
value of the property.”4  
The question then arises:  can there be a “subsequent 
purchaser for value” when the foreclosure sale was void from the 
outset?  Though the Arkansas Supreme Court has never squarely 
addressed this issue, this Comment urges the Court to do so and 
find that there may be no “subsequent purchaser for value” where 
a sale is void from the moment it is made.  Part I explores a brief 
history of the Statutory Foreclosure Act.  It establishes that the 
General Assembly intended the Act to protect homeowners from 
the rampant irregularities that result from unregulated nonjudicial 
foreclosures.   
Next, Part II examines the distinction between void and 
voidable foreclosures of property, positing that Arkansas’s bar of 
claims against subsequent purchasers for value applies only to 
voidable (and not void) foreclosures.  Part II subsequently 
reviews the findings of a number of judiciaries which have 
highlighted this void-voidable distinction in their states’ 
foreclosure processes and adjusted their rulings accordingly.   
Then, Part III examines the proper application of the 
Statutory Foreclosure Act, specifically its protection of 
subsequent purchasers for value in light of the statutory purpose, 
the distinction between void and voidable sales, and the 
approaches pursued by other courts.  Finally, Part III urges the 
Arkansas Supreme Court to make a formal declaration clarifying 
the provision and finding that purchasers of property foreclosed 
upon in a void sale are not “subsequent purchasers for value” 
under the meaning of the statute. 
I.  Courtless Chaos:  Why Enact the Statutory 
Foreclosure Act 
To understand the purpose of the Statutory Foreclosure Act, 
one must first understand the two primary foreclosure 
mechanisms in Arkansas.  The first mechanism is a judicial 
 
3. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2)(B). 
4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2)(C)(i). 
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foreclosure.5  Judicial foreclosures have traditionally been 
considered “the safe plan for all parties.”6  Commentators have 
noted the advantages of judicial foreclosures, with one indicating: 
The title produced by a judicial foreclosure is less 
susceptible to attack than the title produced by a nonjudicial 
foreclosure.  This stability is due to several safeguards. First, 
many potential infirmities are uncovered and resolved when 
an informed chancellor oversees the proceedings.  Second, 
the adversarial nature of judicial foreclosure works to flush 
out defects.  Third, the concept of judicial finality solidifies 
the decree and precludes the prospect of successful post-sale 
attacks as time passes.7 
The second foreclosure mechanism is a power of sale—a 
foreclosure in which the property is offered for sale privately, 
without involvement of the court.8  While judicial foreclosures 
have been lauded,9 powers of sale (i.e., nonjudicial foreclosures) 
have long been met with distrust.10  In 1882, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court indicated that “[d]eeds of trust and mortgages, 
with powers to be executed [out of court], belong to a class of 
instruments which are watched with much jealousy by [the 
courts]. . . . [T]he [courts] have been used to interfere to prevent 
any unnecessary sacrifice, or unfair disregard of the rights of the 
debtor.”11   
Prior to the late 1980s, the abuses of the nonjudicial 
foreclosure system caused courts to “scrutinize[] . . . with great 
care” all powers of sale and set aside any sales not “conducted 
with all fairness, regularity, and scrupulous integrity.”12  Sales 
were so often “opened up for failure to appraise, for irregularity 
 
5. See Edward H. Schieffler, Nonjudicial Foreclosure in Arkansas with the Statutory 
Foreclosure Act of 1987, 41 ARK. L. REV. 373, 373-74 (1988).   
6. See id. at 377 (quoting Littell v. Grady, 38 Ark. 584, 589, 1882 WL 1518, at *3). 
7. Id. at 376 (footnote omitted). 
8. Id. at 373-74. 
9. See Lynn Foster, Statutory Foreclosures in Arkansas: The Law and Recent 
Developments, 66 ARK. L. REV. 111, 114 (2013) (“There are, however, attorneys who never 
use the statutory-foreclosure statute, preferring the judicial process because of its guarantee 
of due process and good title . . . backed by a court decree.”). 
10. See Schieffler, supra note 5, at 376-78. 
11. Littell, 38 Ark. at 589, 1882 WL 1518, at *3; see also Schieffler, supra note 5, at 
377-78. 
12. Littell, 38 Ark. at 589-90, 1882 WL 1518, at *3-4 (emphasis omitted) (internal 
quotations omitted); see Schieffler, supra note 5, at 377-78. 
40 ARKANSAS LAW NOTES 2021 
in the appraisement, want of notice, and other defects” that a 
purchaser could not be sure of his title until he had occupied the 
property long enough to qualify as an adverse possessor.13  Such 
foreclosures were also considered by courts to be “harsh” towards 
borrowers and had the potential to be “oppressive, unjust, and 
unfair.”14 
After years of mismanaged nonjudicial foreclosures, the 
Arkansas General Assembly sought to restrict the common law 
power of sale by enacting the Statutory Foreclosure Act of 1987.15  
In the Assembly’s own words, the Act purported to “provide an 
efficient and fair procedure for the liquidation of defaulted 
mortgage loans to the benefit of both the homeowner and the 
mortgage lender.”16   
The Statutory Foreclosure Act aspired to create a fair 
foreclosure process by elucidating very specific requirements for 
a foreclosure to be deemed valid.17  Among other things, the Act 
places particularized limitations on the entities which may initiate 
a foreclosure,18 the components of a legally effective notice of 
default,19 and the manner of the foreclosure sale.20  Most notably 
for the purposes of this Comment, the Act grants a borrower a 
cause of action when a lender does not strictly comply with the 
statutory provisions.21   
Despite its lofty aims of fairness and protection, the 
Statutory Foreclosure Act has been met with heavy criticism 
 
13. Schieffler, supra note 5, at 377 (quoting A. HUGHES, ARKANSAS MORTGAGES, § 
323 (1930)). 
14. See id. (quoting Littell, 38 Ark. at 589-90, 1882 WL 1518, at *3-4). 
15. See id. at 378 & n.23 (quoting Statutory Foreclosure Act of 1987, 1987 Ark. Acts 
121, § 19).  See generally Statutory Foreclosure Act of 1987, 1987 Ark. Acts 121.  The 
Statutory Foreclosure Act intended to establish “a system of nonjudicial foreclosure 
proceedings as an alternative to judicial foreclosures.”  Dickinson v. Suntrust Nat’l Mortg. 
Inc., 2014 Ark. 513, at 3, 451 S.W.3d 576, 579. 
16. See Schieffler, supra note 5, at 378 n.23 (quoting Statutory Foreclosure Act of 
1987, 1987 Ark. Acts 121, § 19). 
17. See id. at 381 (“The mechanics of the sale are designed to prevent abuses that courts 
were worried about when there was lack of judicial involvement.”).  The Statutory 
Foreclosure Act and the requirements thereof are laid out in ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-50-101 
to -117 (2019). 
18. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-103. 
19. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-104. 
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-107. 
21. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2). 
2021 A-VOID-ABLE CONSEQUENCES          41 
based on its application in practice.22  Critics even made a diligent 
attempt to repeal the Act during the regular session of the 
Arkansas General Assembly in 2013.23  The critics claimed “that 
statutory foreclosure in Arkansas [has] facilitated hasty and unjust 
foreclosures.”24  These criticisms—and the “hasty and unjust 
foreclosures” produced by the current legislation—raise the 
question still unanswered by the Arkansas judiciary:  what 
recourse do borrowers have against third-party buyers when a 
lender wholly ignores the requirements of the Statutory 
Foreclosure Act?  
II.  A-Void-Able Consequences:  Void vs. 
Voidable Sales  
In determining the effects that foreclosure illegalities may 
have on subsequent purchasers, an important clarification must be 
made.  While this Comment posits that there can be no subsequent 
purchasers following void sales, it does not make the same 
assertion when the sale is merely voidable.25  Void sales arise 
where adherence to statutes and fair notice are so wholly absent 
that no title can pass.26  Voidable sales, on the other hand, usually 
involve substantial but not strict compliance with the applicable 
statute.27  Irregularities that might render a sale voidable include 
a confusing title description, a published notice of sale that omits 
the year, or “[a] sale at the east front door instead of the west front 
door as prescribed by the deed of trust.”28  In voidable sales, title 
 
22. See Statutory Foreclosure Act of 1987, 1987 Ark. Acts 121, § 19; H.B. 1847, 89th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). 
23. Nate Coulter, 2013-14 University of Arkansas School of Law Student-Run Clinics 
Yield Policy Insights and Practical Foreclosure Advice to Homeowners, 68 ARK. L. REV. 
551, 585 (2015) (citing H.B. 1847, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013)). 
24. Id. 
25. Any argument that voidable sales could not create bona fide purchasers would be 
futile, as the Arkansas Supreme Court has already stated: “The general rule is that a sale to 
a bona fide purchaser, under a voidable execution, is valid.”  Youngblood v. Cunningham, 
38 Ark. 571, 577, 1882 WL 1516, at *4 (emphasis omitted). 
26. See Foster, supra note 9, at 133; Byers v. Fowler, 12 Ark. 218, 274, 1851 WL 450, 
at *27 (“A party to a void process could acquire no title under it.”). 
27. See City Nat’l Bank v. De Baum, 166 Ark. 18, 20-21, 265 S.W. 648, 648 (1924) 
(“It is admitted that the company did not comply with the provisions of the statute . . . , and 
the notes are voidable for that reason.”). 
28. Schieffler, supra note 5, at 391 n.98 (citing Graham v. Oliver, 659 S.W.2d 601, 
604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted)). 
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passes to the purchaser, but that sale may be set aside if: (1) there 
were irregularities in the foreclosure proceeding, and (2) the 
purchaser of the property does not take the property for new 
value, in good faith, and without notice of prior interests in the 
property.29   
However, if a good faith purchaser buys the property at the 
foreclosure sale, the title remains with that purchaser, even if the 
sale is later set aside as “voidable.”30  This Comment 
acknowledges that the transfer of title to “subsequent purchasers 
for value” is not disrupted if the sale is merely voidable for failure 
to strictly comply with the provisions of the Statutory Foreclosure 
Act.31 
On the other hand, the Arkansas Supreme Court has 
described a void sale as “a nullity, binding on no one.”32  Defects 
rendering foreclosures and subsequent sales void have 
traditionally included forged mortgages, instances where the 
mortgagor did not actually default, and/or a failure by the seller 
to follow “fundamental procedural requirements.”33  For instance, 
“[s]ome procedural requirements are so fundamental, like the 
notice provisions, that completely neglecting them would render 
the sale void.”34 
The Statutory Foreclosure Act is ultimately silent on the 
effect a void sale has upon its miscellaneous provisions.35  
 
29. Id. at 390-91 & n.99 (citing 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL 
ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.20, 7.21, at 557 (2d ed. 1985); Fargason v. Edrington, 49 Ark. 
207, 214, 4 S.W. 763, 764 (1887) (citation omitted)); see also Matlock v. Lomas Mortg. 
U.S.A., Inc., 154 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993) (citing Union Nat’l Bank v. Nichols, 
305 Ark. 274, 807 S.W.2d 36 (1991)); Bill’s Printing, Inc. v. Carder, 357 Ark. 242, 249, 161 
S.W.3d 803, 807 (2004). 
30. See Schieffler, supra note 5, at 391 & n.99 (citing 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.20, 7.21, at 557 (2d ed. 1985); Fargason, 49 
Ark. at 214, 4 S.W. at 764 (citation omitted)); see also Home Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. 
Brown, 188 Ark. 98, 100, 64 S.W.2d 89, 90 (1933) (“The fact that [the decree] was voidable 
. . . could not affect the rights of an innocent purchaser who acquired the title while the 
judgment was in full force and effect.”) (citing Boyd v. Roane, 49 Ark. 397, 5 S.W. 704 
(1887)). 
31. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2)(C) (2019). 
32. Fairbank v. Douglas, 188 Ark. 224, 227, 66 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1933) (quoting 
Tallman v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 185 Ark. 851, 855, 49 S.W.2d 1039, 1041 (1932)), overruled 
on other grounds by Dowell v. Land, 208 Ark. 908, 913, 188 S.W.2d 134, 136 (1945). 
33. Foster, supra note 9, at 133 (quoting 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, 
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.20 (5th ed. 2007)). 
34. Schieffler, supra note 5, at 390. 
35. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116. 
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Historically in Arkansas, when there has been a foreclosure defect 
so substantial that it rendered the sale void, no title passed to the 
so-called “purchaser” of the property.36  In essence, no title could 
pass because no real sale was conducted. 
In Craig v. Meriwether, the Arkansas Supreme Court held a 
sale void where the seller did not conduct an appraisement 
beforehand, as required by the statute.37  The Court found that 
“when foreclosure sales of land under mortgages pursuant to 
power therein conferred are regulated by statute, a sale not in 
conformity with the statute is invalid.”38  It also held that no title 
could transfer under the void sale, stating: “[A] sale under the 
power in the mortgage without complying with the statute is 
invalid . . . no title can be vested thereunder.”39  
In Ford v. Nesbitt, the Court held that sales lacking proper 
notice are void, stating:  
One of the material things to be done was to give the notice 
properly[] . . . . The property in the mortgage could not be 
alienated from the mortgagors except in strict accordance 
with the power therein conferred by that instrument, nor 
could a court of equity assume to confirm and make valid a 
sale not made in strict accordance therewith.40 
While it is worth noting that the rulings in both Craig and 
Nesbitt predated the Statutory Foreclosure Act, the Arkansas 
judiciary has continued to hold defective sales void subsequent to 
the passage of the Act.41  In 1991, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
affirmed an appellate ruling which declared invalid a sale in 
which notice was mailed after twelve days instead of the 
statutorily-prescribed ten.42  Five years later, the Arkansas Court 
 
36. Foster, supra note 9, at 133 (citing 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, 
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.20 (5th ed. 2007)); see also Terry K. Haenny, Validity of a 
Void Foreclosure Judgment?, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 548, 553 (1967) (finding that, when courts 
render judgments without proper jurisdiction, “[n]o rights are acquired by virtue of a void 
judgment, which is no judgment at all”). 
37. Craig v. Meriwether, 84 Ark. 298, 303-05, 105 S.W. 585, 586-87 (1907). 
38. Id. at 304, 105 S.W. at 586. 
39. Id. at 305, 105 S.W. at 587. 
40. Ford v. Nesbitt, 72 Ark. 267, 269, 79 S.W. 793, 794 (1904). 
41. See, e.g., Henson v. Fleet Mortg. Co., 319 Ark. 491, 497, 892 S.W.2d 250, 253 
(1995); Union Nat’l Bank v. Nichols, 305 Ark. 274, 279-80, 807 S.W.2d 36, 39 (1991). 
42. Nichols, 305 Ark. at 279-80, 807 S.W.2d at 39. 
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of Appeals held void a foreclosure and foreclosure sale where 
process was served by the wrong deputy sheriff.43 
Though the Arkansas judiciary has comfortably found a 
myriad of foreclosure irregularities to render subsequent sales 
void,44 it has not yet made clear its stance regarding whether title 
may pass to a subsequent purchaser in a void sale.  Other 
judiciaries, however, have clearly addressed the question.45  
Texas courts have established: 
Purchasers of land from a substitute trustee’s sale are not 
relieved from the necessity of inquiring whether the trustee 
had been empowered to sell.  One who bids on property at a 
foreclosure sale does so “at his peril.”  Purchasers assume 
that the trustee has power to make the sale at their peril, and 
where he is without power, or there is other defect or 
irregularity that would render the foreclosure sale void, 
then the purchaser cannot acquire title to the property.46 
The Texas judiciary has ultimately determined that the 
“effect of ‘good faith purchaser for value without notice’ does not 
apply to a purchaser at a void foreclosure sale” because “[a] 
purchaser at a foreclosure sale obtains only such title as the trustee 
had authority to convey.”47 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has established a similar 
rule, indicating:  
There are limits to the protections provided to bona fide 
purchasers, however, and “[t]he purchaser of an apparently 
perfect record title is not protected against all adverse 
claims.” . . . Generally, the key question in this regard is 
whether the transaction is void, in which case it is a nullity 
 
43. Planters Bank & Tr. Co. v. Smith, No. CA 95-1156, 1996 WL 663899, at *3 (Ark. 
Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1996) (citing Hubbard v. Shores Grp., 313 Ark. 498, 855 S.W.2d 924 
(1993)). 
44. See supra notes 41 & 43 and accompanying text.   
45. See Ralph L. Straw Jr., Off-Record Risks for Bona Fide Purchasers of Interests in 
Real Property, 72 DICK. L. REV. 35, 44 & n.29 (1967) (citing cases where forged instruments 
affected bona fide chain of title). 
46. Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 723-24 (Tex. App. 1985) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted); see Richard E. Flint, Time to Repair the Chain: Void Deeds, 
Subsequent Purchasers, and the Texas Recording Statutes, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 35 (2016). 
47. Flint, supra note 46, at 35 (emphasis omitted) (citing Diversified, Inc., 702 S.W.2d 
at 721; Bowman v. Oakley, 212 S.W. 549, 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919)). 
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such that title never left possession of the original owner 
. . . .48 
The California Supreme Court has held: 
Numerous authorities have established the rule that an 
instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a 
forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the 
foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine 
of bona fide purchase.49 
The Nebraska Supreme Court has followed suit, holding: 
When a sale is void, “no title, legal or equitable, passes to 
the sale purchaser or subsequent grantees.”  In other words, 
“adversely affected parties may have the sale set aside even 
though the property has passed into the hands of a bona fide 
purchaser.” . . . Further, even if there is a right to exercise the 
power of sale, an egregious failure to comply with 
fundamental procedural requirements while exercising the 
power of sale will render the sale void.50 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that, 
where fraud occurs, “no title passes thereby, and a bona fide 
purchaser, for a valuable consideration from the person holding 
the deed, stands in no better situation than such fraudulent 
holder.”51  The Utah Supreme Court found that a deed which is 
void “does not convey any title to the grantee, or mortgagee, 
although he may be an innocent purchaser for value without 
notice.”52  Likewise, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated: “But 
where the deed is regarded as absolutely void, it is held that even 
such a purchaser (innocent or bona fide) can obtain no title.”53 
 
48. Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 896-97 (2011) (quoting Brewster v. 
Weston, 126 N.E. 271, 272 (Mass. 1920)). 
49. Trout v. Taylor, 32 P.2d 968, 970 (Cal. 1934). 
50. Gilroy v. Ryberg, 667 N.W.2d 544, 554 (Neb. 2003) (citations omitted); see also 
King v. De Tar, 199 N.W. 847, 848-49 (Neb. 1924) (“From a review of all the evidence it 
seems clear to us that the deed . . . was fraudulently altered in a material respect and as such 
it became void, and no person, not even a bona fide purchaser, could take anything by such 
deed.”). 
51. Smith v. Markland, 72 A. 1047, 1050 (Pa. 1909) (quoting Van Amringe v. Morton, 
4 Whart. 382, 382 (Pa. 1839)). 
52. N. M. Long Co. v. Kenwood Co., 39 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Utah 1935) (finding that no 
interest can be acquired by a forged deed). 
53. Curry v. Hinton, 231 S.W. 217, 218 (1921) (internal quotations omitted). 
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III.  Not Altering but Clarifying Arkansas’s 
Approach to Void Property Conveyances 
Arkansas is not wholly removed from the many judiciaries 
which have found there can be no subsequent purchaser in a void 
sale.  In 1933, the Arkansas Supreme Court cited similar 
language, stating: “[O]ne purchasing land from a person who 
obtained his title by forgery cannot be treated as an innocent 
purchaser.”54  How then does this comport with Arkansas’s bar of 
claims against a “subsequent purchaser for value” in foreclosure 
proceedings? 
This Comment asserts that Arkansas’s perspective on void 
conveyances has not changed in light of the Statutory Foreclosure 
Act.  Arkansas has always sought to protect property owners.55  A 
reading of the law that would fraudulently divest an unwitting 
homeowner of his or her home, land, and all the memories 
contained therein—with no remedy for the homeowner to recover 
his or her home—would be contrary to the purposes of the Act.56 
Perhaps reflective on this issue, it is important to note that 
Arkansas does not recognize subsequent purchasers for value 
where property is stolen.57  Under Arkansas law, stolen property 
can have no subsequent purchaser, even one who is completely 
 
54. McCarley v. Carter, 187 Ark. 282, 285, 59 S.W.2d 596, 597 (1933) (citing Bird v. 
Jones, 37 Ark. 195, 1881 WL 1478); see also Straw Jr., supra note 45, at 44. 
55. Property ownership is so highly regarded by the state that the Arkansas 
Constitution states: “The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional 
sanction.”  ARK. CONST. art. II, § 22.  Much the same, the Statutory Foreclosure Act was 
enacted, at least in part, to protect property owners from abuse.  See supra notes 15-17 and 
accompanying text.   
56. Evaluating the meaning of any statute requires ascertaining the intent behind the 
legislation.  See State ex rel. Moose v. Trulock, 109 Ark. 556, 563, 160 S.W. 516, 517 (1913) 
(citing 2 LEWIS SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 364) (“‘The intent of a 
statute being the law,’ said Mr. Sutherland, ‘it necessarily follows that the object of all 
interpretation is to find out that intent.’”).  The Arkansas Supreme Court has held:  “It is the 
duty of every Court, when satisfied of the intention of the legislature, clearly expressed in a 
constitutional enactment, to give effect to that intention . . . . And any construction should 
be discarded that would lead to absurd consequences.”  State v. Smith, 40 Ark. 431, 432-
33, 1883 WL 1165, at *1 (emphasis added).  Permitting the hypothetical introduced at the 
beginning of this Comment to occur can easily be classified as an “absurd consequence[]” 
under the Arkansas precedent. 
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-80-103(a) (2013). 
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innocent regarding the illegalities.58  Arkansas’s statute states:  
“All property obtained by theft, robbery, or burglary shall be 
restored to the owner, and no sale, whether in good faith on the 
part of the purchaser or not, shall divest the owner of his or her 
right to the property.”59  For a lender to illegally seize property 
which is lawfully vested in one party and transfer that property to 
another, is this anything other than theft?60 
Now, this Comment by no means intends to suggest that 
minor errors in foreclosure proceedings—though the statute does 
require strict compliance61—should divest subsequent purchasers 
of ownership in the property.  The finality in transfer of title 
guaranteed by the Statutory Foreclosure Act is hugely 
advantageous and should not be uprooted for merely trivial 
discrepancies, nor would the language of the Statutory 
Foreclosure Act support such an interpretation.62  This Comment 
simply posits that there can be no subsequent purchaser where 
there is no valid sale.  
IV.  Conclusion 
It is clear that the protections guaranteed to “subsequent 
purchasers for value” were not intended to apply where the 
 
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-80-103(a); see also Superior Iron Works v. McMillan, 235 
Ark. 207, 210, 357 S.W.2d 524, 526 (1962) (“[I]t is clear that in this jurisdiction title to 
stolen property remains in its rightful owner.”).  
59. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-80-103(a). 
60. In Arkansas: 
(a) A person commits theft of property if he or she knowingly: 
(1) Takes or exercises unauthorized control over or makes 
an unauthorized transfer of an interest in the property of 
another person with the purpose of depriving the owner of 
the property; or 
(2) Obtains the property of another person by deception or 
by threat with the purpose of depriving the owner of the 
property. 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-36-103 (Supp. 2021). 
61. In 1995, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Statutory Foreclosure Act 
requires strict compliance with its provisions.  See Henson v. Fleet Mortg. Co., 319 Ark. 491, 
497, 892 S.W.2d 250, 253 (1995) (“Any statute which is in derogation of or at variance with 
the common law must be strictly construed.”).  In 2020, the Court reiterated this notion with 
its decision in Davis v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, 2020 Ark. 180, at 7, 599 S.W.3d 128, 
132. 
62. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text. 
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foreclosure and subsequent sale were outright void.63  When the 
court asks whether the unwitting homeowner can recover her 
home after waking one day to find it unceremoniously ripped 
away by illegal foreclosure proceedings, the answer should most 
certainly be in the affirmative.  Where the foreclosure sale is 
wholly void and there is no subsequent purchaser, the true owner 
of the home is not changed by the void sale. 
This Comment implores the Arkansas Supreme Court to 
clearly declare this standard.  In doing so, the Arkansas judiciary 
will remain true to the purposes of the Statutory Foreclosure Act, 
rule consistently with well-established precedent, and properly 
adhere to the fundamental fairness in property that Arkansas has 






63. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-116(d)(2)(C) (2019). 
